Aldo-Pier Solari writes > >] Michel Weenink <[log in to unmask]> writes: > >]Remailers strip a mail automatically, leaves nothing whatsoever what >]could point to any identification. > >I understand the above is not correct: An an-mailer allows >communication both ways and it keeps a register as to where anyone >message being processed by the machine comes from. This allows to >redirect replies to an anonymous mail. In the case which originally was brought up by Sue Paduano, Aldo is wrong and Michel is right. The message in question was sent through an anonymous remailer, _not_ an "anonymizing service" like anon.penet.fi. There is no record kept of where incoming messages come from nor a record of where outgoing messages go nor a database of any sort. Incoming messages have their headers revised and are sent back out again. Period. >I suppose the data base within the anonymous mailer could be >scrambled/encrypted. However, it should be an easy walk to an >experienced hacker-catcher. This shows a tremendous lack of understanding of modern encryption techniques. Decrypting a DES- or RSA-encrypted document isn't going to be an "easy walk" for anybody. >Anonymous mailers should be abolished. People who would like to >exchange certain information (victims of sexual abuse or other kinds >of violence, etc.) may always get a number account in a .com >provider. Another preposterous suggestion. Issues of valid use of anonymous remailing notwithstanding, how could such an "abolition" ever be enforced?