Aldo-Pier Solari writes
>
>] Michel Weenink <[log in to unmask]> writes:
>
>]Remailers strip a mail automatically, leaves nothing whatsoever what
>]could point to any identification.
>
>I  understand  the  above  is   not  correct:  An  an-mailer  allows
>communication both ways and it keeps a register as to  where  anyone
>message  being  processed by the machine comes from.  This allows to
>redirect replies to an anonymous mail.
 
In the case which originally was brought up by Sue Paduano, Aldo is wrong
and Michel is right.  The message in question was sent through an anonymous
remailer, _not_ an "anonymizing service" like anon.penet.fi.
 
There is no record kept of where incoming messages come from nor a record
of where outgoing messages go nor a database of any sort.  Incoming
messages have their headers revised and are sent back out again.  Period.
 
>I suppose  the  data  base  within  the  anonymous  mailer  could be
>scrambled/encrypted.  However, it should  be  an  easy  walk  to  an
>experienced hacker-catcher.
 
This shows a tremendous lack of understanding of modern encryption
techniques.  Decrypting a DES- or RSA-encrypted document isn't going to be
an "easy walk" for anybody.
 
>Anonymous mailers should be abolished.  People  who  would  like  to
>exchange certain information (victims of sexual abuse or other kinds
>of  violence,  etc.)  may  always  get  a  number  account in a .com
>provider.
 
Another preposterous suggestion.  Issues of valid use of anonymous
remailing notwithstanding, how could such an "abolition" ever be enforced?