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Subject: Consciousness and Reduction
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Subj: searle talk
Consciousness and Reduction
Jeff Franks, Vanderbilt U. franksjj@vuctrvax
Speculations about Searle: (I'm not sure Searle would agree with what I
attribute to him or with my reconstruction; I'm not totally sure I agree
with them either.)
The following notes are an attempt to clarify for myself the meaning
and implications of three statements from Searle's The Rediscovery of the
Mind. Paraphrased the three statements are:
1) Consciousness (in all its facets) is a causal emergence from neuro-
physiological processes and as such is causally reducible to such
processes. (e.g., pp.110-111)
2) Conscious processes, mental features have causal efficacy. (e.g., pp.
111, 126)
3) Consciousness is causally reducible to brain processes but is not
ontologically reducible to such processes. (e.g., p. 116)
As a first approach to such clarification I'll set up a vastly
simplified context. Consider two successive mental events: E1 (e.g., the
desirous perception of an apple) and E2 (e.g., reaching to grasp the
apple.) Corresponding to E1 and E2, there are two intervals of
neurophysiologically processing, N1 and N2. The moments of consciousness
E1 and E2 are causally reducible to the moments of neural processing N1
and N2, i.e., N1 and N2 produce E1 and E2 respectively as causal emergent
mental (subjective) events in a micro-to-macro causal fashion. However,
it is also the case that the emergent mental events instantiate or
demonstrate a form of causality at the macro level, i.e., the seeing and
desiring of the apple (E1) leads to (causes) reaching for the apple (E2).
The paragraph essentially repeats Searle's statements 1 and 2 in a
simplified, specific form.
In this context I will attempt to clarify the third statement that
consciousness (the stream of mental events) is not ontologically reducible
to neural processing. The clarification comes from consideration of the
relation between N1 and N2. The question is: Does N1 cause N2? I think
the lack of ontological reduction means that the answer to this question
is 'no', or maybe more accurately, 'not completely'. The relation between
N1 and N2 is simply this: N2 is one of a set of possible intervals of
neural processing that could follow the occurrence of N1. That is, given
the physiological structure and dynamics of N1, any of a number of neural
processing events could follow N1 (and also there are innumerable other
neural processing events that could not follow N1.) N1 constrains what
neural events might occur next but N1 doesn't specify ('cause') any
particular following event such as N2. If one had an exhaustive
neurophysiological characterization of N1 (types of neurons activated,
degrees of activation, specification of the spatial and connectedness
relations among neurons, specification of temporal relations of the neuron
firings, and all other physiological specifications pertinent to the
neurophysiology), there would be no neurophysiological properties or
relations that would determine that the next neural event would be N2.
The determination of N2 following N1 is the result of the causal relation
between the emergent conscious events E1 and E2. This causal relation is
not reducible to neurophysiological structures and processes and it is in
this sense that consciousness is not ontologically reducible to
neurophysiology.
But, somehow this account seems to be too easily treated as an
assertion that there is something 'magical' about consciousness; that
consciousness goes beyond what we know to be the case with 'physical'
nature; that consciousness is something that has properties beyond those
permitted by the four basic forces. But this is simply not being
asserted. For each conscious event there is a neural processing event
that causes (micro-to-molar) the conscious event, and this falls within
the bounds of known physical possibilities. So quite simply the
conscious event is in some sense a neurophysiological 'property'. But
this 'property' is emergent and the nature of this emergence is simply the
'function' or 'process' that determines the causal ordering of those
physiological processing events that cause conscious events.
An alternate way to clarify these issues is to consider two other
successive neurophysiological events Na and Nb, where Na and Nb do not
cause corresponding emergent conscious events. The capacities included in
the Background (cf Searle) lead to such events. In this case, the
neurophysiology of Na would in fact 'cause' the succession to Nb; a
complete neurophysiological characterization of event Na would determine
that Nb would follow.* Suppose we have a system that is nonconscious for
some period of time. During this period, there would be a stream of
neural processing of the Na to Nb sort. The stream would exhibit
neurophysiological causality. Certain neural processing events would
follow certain prior neural processing events.
Now suppose the system woke up. Now Na and Nb type events come under
additional constraints 'imposed' by the nature of N1 and N2 type events;
events that evoke causally emergent conscious events E1 and E2. Given the
additional constraints, Na might be followed by Nc rather than Nb.** The
emergent effect of N1, N2 type processes is the causal reordering of Na,
Nb, Nc type processes. The reordering is a reordering of neural
processing events, i.e., the reordering is a neurophysiological process.
What is the nature of this reordering process? It is conscious processing
with the characteristics of subjectivity, intentionality and so forth.
Can this neurophysiological reordering process be reduced to
neurophysiology? Consider a gedanken experiment. Suppose an omniscient
being had a complete theory of neurophysiological processing. In
particular, the theory of the system contained an account that specified
the ordering of neurophysiological events in the absence of consciousness
(i.e., specified the causal ordering of Na, Nb, Nc type events) and also
contained an account that specified the changes and reorderings of these
events that occurred when the system was conscious (processing amidst the
occurrence of N1, N2 type events.) One could say that the complete theory
was composed of two neurophysiological sub-theories, emphasizing that the
sub-theories together formed an account of neurophysiological causation.
In this way one might conclude that the latter N1,N2 type subtheory was
sort of a reduction of consciousness to neurophysiology. But what
exactly would be the nature of this latter subtheory? How would one
describe the nature of the reorderings?
In fact, we already have a theory of the nature of the reorderings, at
least an ordinary everyday approximation to such a theory. The
reordering relations are exactly those referred to by subjectivity,
intention, and the other language we use for consciousness and mind. The
first person relational qualities are exactly the reordering relations and
the reordering relations are exactly the emergent qualities of
consciousness. Na, Nb type neurophysiological events differ from N1, N2
type neurophysiological events exactly in the fact that the causal
ordering among the latter but not the former are determined by first
person type relations. The two types of causal orderings (N1, N2 vs. Na,
Nb orderings) are ontologically different. They involve inherently
different types of relations. Whether or not one wants to call a theory
of the N1,N2 type orderings a neurophysiological theory really doesn't
matter; it is and it isn't. The important point is that for a theory of
Na,Nb type processing, an appropriate language (appropriate in reflecting
the nature of the ontology) is the third person language of neuronal
types and connections, timing of firing patterns and so forth (i.e., the
usual language of neurophysiology), while an appropriate language for a
theory of N1,N2 processing is the first person language of consciousness
events and the stream of consciousness. Suppose the omniscient being gave
me data matrices that specified the ordering of events for the two types
of 'neurophysiological' systems. I studied the matrices and finally
figured out how to characterize the nature of the reorderings i.e., the
nature of the relations between the two sub systems. What I would
discover is that the relations in my characterization would simply be the
relations involved in first person perspectival consciousness. Whether
couched in neurophysiological orderings or in terms of the conscious
stream, the relations would remain what they are, the relations that
constitute first person subjectivity. The latter relations are
ontologically not reducible to the third person neurophysiological
relations appropriate for the 'strict' neurophysiological account.
Speculations beyond Searle: (This I have a hunch is on the right track but
certainly haven't developed it clearly and fully.)
The following is a general speculation about the basic nature of the
conscious reordering relations ie a speculation concerning the core
phenomenon that underlies first person etc relations. The speculation is
that consciousness is essentially a negation relation which from a
strictly neurophysiological perspective appears as an anomolous
disruption of neurophysiological causal relations.
From third person neurophysiology, the relations of consciousness are
nothing at all; nothing that can be characterized. Why? Because the very
essence of these relations involves a kind of negation rather than
positive occurrence. The negation is the reordering of third person
neurophysiological causal relations; a kind of mistake from the latter
perspective. From the latter perspective something should have happened
but it didn't. Every conscious event involves an aspect(s) of negation in
the sense of cancellation of a particular 'flow' of neurophysiological
causality. I suggest that the stream of consciousness is a stream of such
negations. Yet, the stream of consciousness is not just negation; it is
negation as constraints on the manifestations of Background capacities and
appears as constrained manifestations of such Background. A critical
point is that the stream of such Background manifestations can be
automatized. This means that conscious streams arising from negative
constraints, can become part of the Background. This doesn't mean than
segments of the conscious stream somehow become part of the background and
thus the possibility of conscious causality becomes part of the Background
potentials and becomes a sort of unconscious causality. Rather with
repeated experience, practice, or whatever, that leads to automatization,
the neurophysiological structures and processes become modified and
manifest different causal patterns. In other words, what was a reordering
in the original conscious experiencing, through automatization becomes a
capacity that is fully reducible to third person neurophysiological
processes. So, in some sense, first person conscious relations or
processes (which are the phenomenal manifestations of negation) appear in
two roles in relation to Background relations or processes. Immediate
reorderings of neurophysiological causal relations via negation and
'learned' modifications in the Background relations (i.e. in the
neurophysiological causal patterns) that develop as a consequence of the
negations. These learned reorderings or modifications do not have, or do
not instantiate, first person relations. Consciousness is online; it's
not stored. Finally importantly I suggest consciousness is essentially
negation and negation is just that, 'negation', and isn't also some
positive relation. That is, negating a particular neurophysiological
causal process doesn't determine the next particular neurophysiological
event. Some such event will occur and this will constitute a (conscious)
reordering but the conscious negation didn't determine this next event.
The next event is determined by Background, neurophysiological capacities
in light of the negation (i.e., interruption of) the immediately prior
stream of neurophysiological events.
* The argument would differ in detail but not in substance if recast in
terms of probabilistic determination among sets of events.
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